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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE:
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE GOSTIN*
Thank you. I should begin by mentioning my conflicts of in-
terest. Not only did I co-author one of the amicus briefs before
the Supreme Court, 1 but I have also been writing with Timothy
Quill and others in support of physician-assisted suicide dying. 2
" Professor Lawrence Gostin received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law in
1974 and an honorary Doctorate of Law conferred by the Trustees and Chancellor of the
State University of New York (system-wide) in 1994. In 1974-75, Professor Gostin was a
Fulbright Fellow in Psychiatry and Law at Balliol College, Oxford University and the
Social Research Unit, University of London.
Lawrence Gostin is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, a Pro-
fessor of Public Health at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public
Health, and the Co-Director of the Johns Hopkins/Georgetown University Program on
Law and Public Health. Professor Gostin is also a Fellow of the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics of Georgetown University and a member of the Steering and Executive Commit-
tees of the Georgetown University Institute for Health Care Research and Policy.
He is a member of the Advisory Committee on HIV and STD Prevention of the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as the advisory committees for the
World Health Organization, the Council of International Organizations for Medical Sci-
ences, and the Institute of Medicine (National Academy of Sciences).
Professor Gostin is the Editor of the Health Law and Ethics section of the Journal of
the American Medical Association (JAMA). He is also on the editorial board of scholarly
journals, including the Yale Journal on Regulation, the International Journal of Bioeth-
ics, and the International Journal of Health and Human Rights. Formerly, Professor
Gostin was Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Executive Editor of
the American Journal of Law & Medicine, and Western European Editor of the Interna-
tional Journal of Law and Psychiatry.
As a member of the President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform, Profes-
sor Gostin's principal areas of work included the ethical foundations of the health care
system, public health, and privacy and health information (Chair).
Professor Gostin was formerly Executive Director of the American Society of Law,
Medicine & Ethics and Adjunct Professor of Law and Public Health at Harvard Univer-
sity. In the United Kingdom, Professor Gostin was the Chief Executive of the National
Council for Civil Liberties, Legal Director of the National Association of Mental Health,
and a member of the faculty of Oxford University. Professor Gostin received the Rose-
mary Delbridge Memorial Award from the National Consumer Council (U.K.) as the per-
son "who has most influenced Parliament and Government to act for the welfare of soci-
ety." He also received the Key to Tokyo University (Japan) for distinguished
contributions to human rights in mental health.
I See Amicus Brief of Law Professors for Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, Washington v.
Glucksberg (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), Dec. 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 709330.
2 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: From Quinlan
to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco-A Brief History and Analysis of Constitutional Protec-
599
600 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
I believe that constitutional law really cannot be separated from
the morals and ethics involved in this discussion. 3 Consequently,
I will address three primary areas.
First, I am going to look at some ethical reasoning supporting
physician-assisted dying. Second, I will examine some of the
lines that have been drawn between withdrawing and withhold-
ing life sustaining treatment 4 on the one hand and physician-
assisted dying on the other. 5 Finally, I will relate both of these
matters to constitutional reasoning beginning with Cruzan6 and
ending with the cases currently before the Supreme Court. 7
Let us begin with a discussion at the ethical level by looking at
some of the principles that might help guide us through our in-
quiries. We need to remind ourselves that we do not need to be
judges, lawyers or law professors to understand this issue. This
is an issue that exists at the deepest human level, and involves a
far reaching social debate which involves us all.8 We will all face
this issue whether we are young, old, male, female, healthy, sick.
Therefore, we have to try to understand what kinds of ethical
principles might guide this kind of fundamentally important de-
cision in all of our lives.
We ought to start with the ethical principle of respect for per-
sons. That is, everyone who is competent has an autonomy in-
terest in deciding what will happen with their lives, and what
tion of the 'Right to Die, 278(18) JAMA 1523, 1523-28 (1997); Frank G. Miller & Timothy
E. Quill, et. al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331(2) NEW ENG. J. MED. 119,
119-23 (1994).
3 See generally DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WIcKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: AN HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE OF EUTHANASIA (1987) (providing overview of right to die con-
troversy).
4 See THOMAS A. RAFFIN, WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE SUPPORT: MEDICAL
ASPECTS IN LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINE (James R. Vevain et al. eds., 1989) (discussing
removal of life support as non-culpable option).
5 See T. Howard Stone & William J. Winsdale, Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in the United States, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 481, 482 (1995) (noting that majority
of states do not permit physician-assisted suicide).
6 See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing exis-
tence of right to refuse medical treatment as inherent in liberty interest of Fourteenth
Amendment).
7 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding New York Statute ban-
ning physician-assisted suicide unconstitutional), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Compas-
sion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that prohibition
against physician-assisted suicide violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
8 See generally GERALD A. LARUE, III, PLAYING GOD - 50 RELIGIONS' VIEWS ON YOUR
RIGHT TO DIE (1996) (offering differing views on individual right to choose when to die).
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people can or cannot do with their lives. 9 Given our human sense
of respect for persons, I think that each individual ought to have
a sense of control. This sense of control should encompass our
entire life span, including the dying process. Therefore, it ought
to give us the right to determine the manner and timing of our
own death, so that we have some voice in this final chapter in
human life. 10
The dying process, after all, is the most intimate, private and
fundamental of all parts of life. 11 It is the voice that we, as hu-
mans, assert in influencing this autonomous part of our life. At
the moment of our death, this right of autonomy ought not to be
taken from us simply because we are dying. 12
An autonomous person should not be required to have a good
reason for the decision that he or she will make; that is the na-
ture of autonomy. We do not judge for other competent human
beings what may be in their best interest, but instead allow
them to determine that for themselves.
As such, an autonomous person does not need to have a good
understanding or even good reasons. All they need is an under-
standing of what they are confronting. 13 There is no reason to
believe that when a person faces imminent death that they have
less human understanding, or less ability to fathom what they
will face, than other people.
Of course, death is a mystery. But death is what we will all
confront sooner or later, and we all may wish to assert our inter-
ests in how we may die. It doesn't matter how we assert those
interests. Some of us may believe passionately in the sanctity of
life. If a person holds this belief, he or she will choose not to ex-
pedite the natural dying process. Others, however, may believe
9 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (holding competent person has constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment).
10 See generally MARGARET C. JASPER, THE RIGHT TO DIE 1 (1996) (suggesting that
primitive societies viewed assisting dying as act of mercy and respecting ill people and
modern society views assisting dying as compassionate and merciful).
11 See generally RITA MARKER, DEADLY COMPASSION (1995) (discussing personal and
public sides of euthanasia debate).
12 See Rachel D. Kleinberg & Toshiro M. Mochizuki, The Final Freedom: Maintain-
ing Autonomy and Valuing Life in Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 197, 197 (1997) (explaining that federally recognized ban on assisted suicide con-
stituted equal protection violation).
13 See Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his body").
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that living in anguish is not meaningful. If a person holds this
view, he or she may seek assistance in dying at some point. It
should not matter which choice a person makes, provided that
choice is free and informed.
Although we may not need any reasons for making autono-
mous decisions, the reasons asserted by most patients are un-
derstandable. They are fathomable on a human level. People
may confront unendurable pain, mental anguish, emotional an-
guish, suffering, indignity and knowledge of the inevitability of
the result.
This is a person who neither wants to die nor seeks to die.
Therefore, I think that physician-assisted suicide is not the right
term because the person is not seeking suicide. They know they
will die soon, and their only decision is to decide how best they
can make that death as peaceful, as humane, and respectful of
their own integrity as possible. 14
In Cruzan, in a wonderful dissent by one of my heroes Justice
Brennan, he asked who should make the decision about with-
drawing life sustaining treatment. 15 Should it be the government
or the state? Or should it be the person's family? He then
paused and said, "To ask that question is to answer it. '' 16 I think
that is the answer today. Who is best to decide the timing and
manner of one's own death than oneself, without state interfer-
ence?
I also believe that the ethical principle of beneficence militates
in favor of permitting physician-assisted dying. We seek a phy-
sician's help in relieving suffering and affording comfort. We
may never choose that physician's assistance in our death and to
me, that is one of the most important parts of physician-assisted
dying. It is the comfort that we give each other by knowing that
at the moment of our death, our physician will not turn his or
her back on us. We may never want to use the physician's assis-
tance and the overwhelming majority of us do not wish to use
14 See generally Cheryl K. Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide, 8 ISSUES L.
& MED. 503, 513 (1993) (noting that assisted death is exercise of free will and is not to be
viewed as taking of life).
15 See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 303 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating relatively narrow question before Court).
16 See id. at 303-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (offering answer to question before
Court).
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it.1 7 But one day, if we are in unendurable pain and facing cer-
tain death, we would like the comfort of knowing that we will not
be abandoned when we need help the most.1
8
A third kind of ethical reasoning is consequentialist reasoning.
Oddly enough, it is the consequentialist, rather than the norma-
tive area, that concerns me most about my decision on physician-
assisted dying. I am not one who feels absolutely certain in the
correctness of my position in this debate. My greatest concern is
the idea of the vulnerability and the potential for exploitation
and abuse in physician-assisted dying. Some people put it rhet-
orically as follows: How can we, in a society that does not give
the right to healthcare, give the right to have a physician's assis-
tance in the dying process? I think that is a powerful rhetorical
statement.
I would answer it in the following way: I believe that we ought
to have a right to healthcare, and have the kind of palliative re-
medial treatment that may be needed. At the same time, I also
believe that the state ought not interfere in a physician-patient
relationship, where both the physician and patient agree that
they would wish assistance to hasten death.
I realize that this could be problematic for those who are eld-
erly, poor and disenfranchised in society. 19 I also worry greatly
that, in a society where healthcare costs are so monumental,
such a burden on individuals and families might result in indi-
viduals hastening their death because of the financial responsi-
bility borne by their families if they continue to live. 20 This is
something that worries me a great deal, and it is something that
I know we, as a society, must discuss.
I do believe that while physician-assisted dying has certain
problems from a consequentialist point of view, there is no rea-
son why we cannot have careful, precise and thoughtful safe-
17 See Abstracts, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 105, 107 (1997) (stating that clear majority of
persons do not support physician-assisted suicide).
18 See Marshall B. Kapp, Old Folks on the Slippery Slope: Elderly Patients and Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 443, 444 (1996) (noting that public opinion polls
show America's youth are more supportive of physician- assisted suicide than elderly
Americans).
19 See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 76 (2d ed. 1995) (suggesting safeguards
needed to successfully implement aid in dying process).
20 See Scott FitzGibbon & Kwan Kew Lai, The Model Physician-Assisted Suicide Act
and the Jurisprudence of Death, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 126, 141-42 (1996)
(discussing economic benefits of physician-assisted suicide).
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guards to ensure that only competent individuals make these
decisions. 21 We must also ensure that no undue burden exists or
coercion is exercised upon these individuals. I do not think this
will make these problems go away, but I do think that it will
ease it.
My next point related to both ethics and law is the question of
line drawing. Most of you will remember that society went
through very much the same thing that we are going through
now when it looked at the questions of withdrawing and with-
holding life sustaining treatment. 22 It took more than a decade of
ethical and judicial reasoning for us to now accept that it is ethi-
cally, constitutionally and legally appropriate for physicians to
withdraw or withhold life sustaining treatment.23
There are powerful ethical reasons that have been offered for
this. Philosophically, there is another inquiry that we need to
make: Are there any morally relevant distinctions between
seeking a physician's assistance at the end of life and the abate-
ment of treatment, the withdrawal or withholding of treat-
ment?24
Therefore, I want to posit two similarly situated cases to you.
First, a person is under life support and she is seeking to hasten
her death by withdrawal of life support, whether it be a nasal
gastric tube, respirator or the like. The second is a person who is
not on life support, but is similarly dying, seeking to hasten her
death by self-administration of prescription medication.
There are several reasons why people believe that a rational
distinction can be drawn between those two cases. However, I
think that those distinctions are not morally relevant. The first
is that physician-assisted dying requires an active physician's
21 See Edward J. Larson, Prescription for Death: A Second Opinion, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 461, 482 (1995) (discussing state interest in deterring undue influence upon compe-
tent, terminally ill patients).
22 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Rsnack, Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment: The De-
cision-Making Process After Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 842,
862 (1991) (continuing debate regarding health care legislation which permits withdraw-
ing of life-sustaining medical treatment).
23 See Lonnie R. Bristow, Report of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical
Association: Euthanasia/Physician-Assisted Suicide: Lessons in the Dutch Experience, 10
ISSUES L. MED. 81, 89-90 (1994) (discussing physician-assisted suicide and concluding
that physicians should avoid assisted suicide as it is contrary to practice of medicine).
24 See Daniel Callahan & Margo White, Legalization of Physician- Assisted Suicide
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 73 (1996) (recognizing
active and passive distinctions between both procedures).
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role. This distinction is based on the difference between an act
and an omission-a distinction that most moral philosophers
have long ago relinquished.25
The physician acts affirmatively in hastening death in both
cases. 26 In fact, it is plausible to say that the physician must do
more in withdrawing treatment. It is a complicated procedure to
withdraw a nasal gastric tube and prescribe palliative medica-
tion for the patient. Is it not much less active for the physician
simply to write a prescription? In both cases, the result is the
same and in both cases there is a clear affirmative act that re-
sults in the death. 27
The second moral reason that has been proffered is that phy-
sician-assisted dying causes death that would not otherwise re-
sult from the underlying disease. In both cases, death is not a
result of the underlying disease, but a consequence of the physi-
cian's behavior. 28 When a physician withdraws a feeding tube,
the person does not die from her underlying disease, but rather
from starvation. The same is true with a ventilator. Patients do
not die from the underlying disease, they die from a lack of res-
piration. There is an affirmative relationship between what the
physician does and the certain death that follows. 29
My analysis does warrant a caveat. For example, when a per-
son is under artificial respiration, it is possible to argue that ab-
sent the ventilator, the person would die of the underlying dis-
ease that prevents respiration. The same thing would be true for
a comatose person who has a nasal gastric tube. The underlying
25 See James S. Reitman, M.D., The Debate on Assisted Suicide-Redefining Morally
Appropriate Care for People with Intractable Suffering, 11 IssuEs L. & MED. 299, 299-300
(1995) (discussing physician's role in relieving patient's suffering).
26 See Amicus Brief of the American Medical Student Association and a Coalition of
Distinguished Medical Professionals in Support of Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), available in 1996 WL 709332, at *7 (explaining
that physician's removal of life support from dependent patient is affirmative act and
causally no different than physician's affirmative act in assisting in suicide of terminal
patient).
27 See George P. Smith, II, Symposium on Law and Medicine, All's Well That Ends
Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-
Determination, 22 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 275, 350 (1989) (discussing omissions to act and
resulting liability).
28 See generally BARRY FURROW, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE AND ETHICS 320 (1991)
(discussing passive and active conduct).
29 See generally Paul J. Zwier, Allen Chair Symposium, Looking for a Nonlegal Proc-
ess: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Care Perspective, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 199, 208
(1996) (acknowledging that withdrawal of medical technology "includes an affirmative act
of doing something, whether it be removing a tube or turning off the respirator").
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disease prevents the patient from taking in food. Although the
distinctions may have some moral differences, they are negligible
because, in both cases, the doctor's intervention is so closely re-
lated to the death itself.30
A third distinction, and this is one that has been expressed
significantly and powerfully in the Jesuit tradition, is the idea of
intention. That is, in physician-assisted dying, the doctor and
the patient intend the patient's death. This intent is what is
considered morally wrong. In both cases, I think there is a very
strong moral claim that the intent is the same. In both cases,
both the physician and the doctor do intend the same result, the
patient's death. The patient wants to die in both cases. Given
the current state of their disease and their dying process, the
patient chooses to die. To be sure, it is not that the patients
want to die; indeed they would like to live if they had a decent
quality of life. It is only that they want to be free from pain,
physical, mental, emotional suffering, and indignity. Therefore,
in both cases, withdrawing life sustaining treatment and physi-
cian-assisted dying, the patient's intent is the same. Further-
more, the doctor and the patient realize and know that death
will be the consequence of the decision that they make. Given
this context, in terms of what we know and what we intend,
there is very little difference.
We often speak of terminal sedation. This is often called in
medical jargon "the double effect."' 31 The double effect has been
something that has been going on in medicine for many years.
In such a circumstance, the patient is dying and the patient and
doctor know the inevitable result. Although they both know
what each wants, they know that there is a criminal proscription
against affirmatively killing the patient. In order to circumvent
the criminal liability, the doctor gives so much sedation that it
impedes or impairs respiration and the patient stops breathing.
30 See James Bopp, Jr., Nutrition and Hydration for Patients: The Constitutional As-
pects, 4 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 14 (1988) (discussing whether death from removal of feeding
tube results in underlying natural death).
31 See Peter Blanck et al., Socially-Assisted Dying and People with Disabilities: Some
Emerging Legal, Medical, and Policy Implications, 21 MENTAL & PHYS. DISABILITY L.
REP. 538, 539 (1997) (discussing "double effect" of palliative care which may result in
death of patient); see also Alycia C. Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models
for Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 635, 648n.62
(1997) (defining principle of "double effect" as being used "to evaluate whether action in-
volving more than one effect is moral").
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Both patient and doctor know what is going on, and there is a
double effect. 32 The effect is to give sedation in the sense that we
want to ease pain, but the knowledge is that the person will die.
Finally, let me relate this to the Constitution. I think that the
substantive due process question is the stronger claim. 33 The
difficult question that arises is whether there is a liberty inter-
est. Justice Scalia has observed, I think correctly, that the exis-
tence of a liberty interest is not a casual issue. On the other
hand, I would say to Justice Scalia that one thing I do notice is
that virtually every time the Supreme Court declares a liberty
interest, the state wins and the individual loses. That is, the
state interest seems to always override the liberty interest un-
less the liberty interest is of a fundamental nature, a fundamen-
tal right.34
The Supreme Court stated in Cruzan that it was asked to an-
swer one particular question: When should a person have a right
to die? 35 If we were to take the Supreme Court literally, and I do
believe that the Supreme Court will regret and retract that
statement in the upcoming case, then it would be interesting to
see how the Supreme Court could do anything other than to find
a liberty interest in this case.36 Clearly, the person is seeking the
right to choose the manner and timing of their death. 37 If so,
they have a liberty interest in the right to die no less than Nancy
Cruzan had a liberty interest. 3
8
32 See David Van Biema, Fatal Doses Assisted Suicide Soars in an Afflicted Commu-
nity, TIME, Feb. 17, 1997, at 72, available in 1997 WL 8543150 (noting that, in general, it
is understood that between seven and nine percent of American doctors assist their pa-
tients in dying).
33 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding state ban on assisted suicide impinges upon liberty interest protected by due
process), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); see also
Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional Rights and Reme-
dies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292, 304 (1996) (arguing that laws prohibiting physician assistance
in dying violate liberty interest protected by due process).
34 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (explaining that Fourteenth
Amendment "forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at
all.., unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
35 See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (stating one
question Court was to answer).
36 See id. at 280 (holding competent person has constitutionally protected interest in
refusing medical treatment).
37 See Steven J. Wohlander, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and
the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 363 (1984) (suggesting that
terminally ill patients have constitutionally protected right to determine time and man-
ner of death).
38 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (noting constitutionally protected liberty interest to
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What I think, however, is that the Supreme Court will have a
much more limited reading of Cruzan. It will find from Cruzan
that there is no liberty interest in the right to die, but simply the
freedom from restraint, the freedom to say "no" to medical
treatment. This freedom has a long common law tradition and a
constitutional tradition, particularly at the state court level. If
this reading of Cruzan is accurate, it is possible that the Court
would make a distinction between a person having a liberty in-
terest in refusing treatment imposed upon him on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, making the affirmative request for help
in the dying process.
Recently, of course, the Supreme Court has been particularly
adverse to the idea that constitutional rights are affirmative, or
positive, in nature. In this instance, however, I think the best
argument would be that the doctor is the state's gatekeeper to
the administration of medication. Because medication cannot be
purchased over the counter, it cannot be used effectively and
humanely without the physician's prescription and the physi-
cian's advice. Effectively, the state is preventing the patient
from doing what the patient seeks. 39
Let us just suppose that the Supreme Court finds that there is
a liberty interest. 40 It seems to me that if there is a liberty inter-
est, the one thing the state cannot do is snuff that liberty inter-
est out completely. Unfortunately, physician-assisted suicide is
completely banned in most of these cases.4 1 Therefore, I think
refuse medical treatment may be inferred from Supreme Court's prior decisions).
39 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing that court cannot ignore patients' individual interests and must balance rele-
vant state interest against individual's liberty interest in seeking physician aid in dying),
rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); see also Zweir, supra
note 29, at 224 (noting that state interest in preserving life and prevention of suicide
must be balanced against terminally ill individual's liberty interest).
40 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1997) (holding that New York State may
distinguish between assisted suicide and withholding life-sustaining treatment and find
former criminal).
41 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.080(a), (f) (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3210 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-13-905(a), (f), 20-17-
210(a), (g) (Michie 1991 and Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7191.5(a), (g)
(West Supp. 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4723 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ((
15-14-504(4), 15-18-112(1), 15-18.5-101(3), 15-18.6-108 (1987 and Supp. 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-575 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 16, § 2512 (Supp. 1996); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2430, 21-2122 (1995 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. §§765.309(1), (2) (Supp.
1996); GA. CODE ANN. 4§ 31-32-11(b), 31-36-2(b) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-13
(1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996); ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 755, §§ 3579(f), 40/5,
40/50, 45/2-1 (West 1992); IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1-13, 16-36-4-19, 30-5-5-17 (1994 & Supp.
1996); IOWA CODE §§ 144A.11.1-144A.11.6, 144B.12.2 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-109
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the Supreme Court should find that a liberty interest exists. The
Court should also state that there are some fundamental and
important state interests. Consequently, the state could safe-
guard or regulate this practice, but could not completely prohibit
or ban it.
Finally, I simply will end on a personal and human level.
When I was young, my mother died, and she died a long death.
She was in and out of a comatose medical condition for a long
period of time. My father reminded me this morning, that, at
the time, he went to his physician and said, "Well, she is clearly
going to die. There is clearly nothing that you can do to help her.
She is clearly never again going to be in a sentient human state
in the sense that she can interact. Why just let her lie here in
bed? Why can't you do anything to help her?"
His answer to my father then was a simple one. The law, the
state, the government will not allow it.
(1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.638 (Banks-Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40: §§
1299.58.10(A), (B) (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS 201D, § 12 (1997); MD. CODE HEALTH
ANN. § 5-611(c) (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN-, tit. 18-A, §§ 5-813(b), (c) (West Supp. 1996);
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